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Abstract—Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have
achieved remarkable success in medical image analysis tasks.
In ultrasound (US) imaging, CNNs have been applied to object
classification, image reconstruction and tissue characterization.
However, CNNs can be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, even
small perturbations applied to input data may significantly affect
model performance and result in wrong output. In this work, we
devise a novel adversarial attack, specific to ultrasound (US)
imaging. US images are reconstructed based on radio-frequency
signals. Since the appearance of US images depends on the
applied image reconstruction method, we explore the possibility
of fooling deep learning model by perturbing US B-mode image
reconstruction method. We apply zeroth order optimization to
find small perturbations of image reconstruction parameters,
related to attenuation compensation and amplitude compression,
which can result in wrong output. We illustrate our approach
using a deep learning model developed for fatty liver disease
diagnosis, where the proposed adversarial attack achieved success
rate of 48%.
Index Terms—adversarial attacks, deep learning, fatty liver,
transfer learning, ultrasound imaging
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have achieved re-
markable success in medical image analysis tasks, such as im-
age classification, object detection and semantic segmentation.
However, CNNs can be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, even
small perturbations applied to input data may significantly
affect model performance and result in wrong output [1]–[3].
Such perturbations may occur accidentally or can be inten-
tionally designed with the aim to fool the model, for example
by direct modification of the input image pixel intensities.
Existence of adversarial examples raises questions about the
robustness of deep learning models, and is especially important
in medical imaging. In ultrasound (US) imaging, the appear-
ance of tissues depends on the applied image reconstruction
method. US image pixel intensities depend on the attenuation
compensation technique and the algorithms used to process
radio-frequency (RF) US signals. Nonlinear compression of
US echoes may enhance the visibility of tissue interfaces,
but also remove speckle patterns specific to particular tissues.
In practice, radiologists and physicians use different scanner
settings to obtain the desired US image quality. However, as
presented in the previous studies, modifications of US image
pixel intensities may affect extraction of texture features and
lower the performance of US based machine learning models
[4]–[6]. In the case of other medical imaging modalities, the
vulnerability of deep learning models to adversarial attacks
has been presented, among others, using dermoscopy images
[7].
In this work, we devise a novel approach to adversarial
attacks, which is specific to US imaging. In comparison to
methods from computer vision that directly modify image
pixel intensities, we explore the possibility of fooling deep
learning model by perturbing B-mode US image reconstruc-
tion method [2]. We investigate whether a modification of
the reconstruction method may change the distribution of
US image pixel intensities, and consequently result in wrong
output. We illustrate the proposed approach using a deep
learning model developed for the diagnosis of fatty liver
disease, which is an important medical problem [8], [9]. First,
we use transfer learning to develop a deep learning model
for classification of liver US images. Second, we apply zeroth
order optimization (ZOO) to find a perturbation in the space
of image reconstruction parameters, which results in wrong
classification of the inputted reconstructed US image. To the
best of our knowledge, while several groups have proposed
deep learning models for fatty liver disease diagnosis, the
robustness of such methods to adversarial attacks has not been
investigated yet [10]–[12].
II. METHODS
A. Dataset
To develop the deep learning model and to assess the
proposed adversarial attack, we used the following datasets:
1) 178 US images collected from 178 patients with the GE
Vivid E9 System (GE Healthcare INC, Horten, Norway).
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2) 33 RF data frames (post-beamformed, before US image
reconstruction) collected from 33 patients with Siemens
System (Siemens, Issaquah, Wash).
The data were collected from the liver/kidney view from
patients admitted for bariatric surgery. The scanning was
performed with convex transducers operating at imaging fre-
quency of around 2.5 MHz. Fatty liver disease was diagnosed
based on liver biopsy (more than 5% hepatocytes with steato-
sis). For each dataset, approximately 65% of patients had
fatty liver disease. Several US images from each dataset are
presented in Fig. 1.
B. Image reconstruction
Commonly, the reconstruction method includes several pro-
cedures, e.g. attenuation compensation, compression of RF
signals, data interpolation and resizing. In our case, the re-
construction of US images based on RF signals included the
following steps:
1) Amplitude calculations with the Hilbert transform.
2) Attenuation compensation based on fixed attenuation
coefficient β.
3) Interpolation from the coordinate space of the convex
transducer to correct spatial dimensions.
4) Logarithmic compression of amplitude samples and
thresholding to specific decibel range specified by upper
αu and lower αl threshold levels (e.g. amplitude samples
below αl were set to αl).
5) Mapping of compressed and thresholded amplitude sam-
ples to US image pixel intensities (8 bits).
In this work, we performed the adversarial attack based on
the modification of the attenuation coefficient β and the com-
pression threshold levels αu and αl. We selected these param-
eters, because any modification of these parameters directly
affects US image pixel intensities, and consequently change
the appearance of edges and speckle patterns in US image.
For the sake of the experiments, we also selected the following
initial reconstruction parameters: β=0.9 dB/(cm*MHz), αl=10
dB, αu=55 dB. These parameters were used as a starting point
for the search of the adversarial perturbation. Selection of the
attenuation coefficient was motivated by the previous studies
on fatty liver disease assessment with quantitative US [13],
[14]. The compression threshold levels were selected based
on subjective visual assessment of differently reconstructed
US images.
C. Deep learning model
We used the InceptionResNetV2 CNN pre-trained on the
ImageNet dataset for the fatty liver disease diagnosis [15],
[16]. The last dense layer was replaced with a randomly
initialized dense layer suitable for the binary classification.
The network was trained using the first dataset and with the
images from the second dataset reconstructed based on the
initial parameters. Stochastic gradient descent algorithm was
applied to minimize the binary cross-entropy loss. Dropout
regularization and early stopping were applied to address the
over-fitting problem. Loss function was weighted to take into
Fig. 1. US images acquired with the two scanners and used in our study to
investigate the proposed adversarial attack.
account class imbalance. Moreover, the reconstructed gray-
scale US images were resized to (299, 299), the original
input size the InceptionResNetV2 CNN, and duplicated across
all color channels to imitate RGB images. These two steps
may also be considered as the part of the US input image
reconstruction method.
D. Adversarial attack
The proposed method works in a black-box setting, it only
requires the access to the output of the network to calculate
the loss function (binary cross-entropy in our case) [17], [18].
The attack is performed for each RF data frame separately. We
reconstruct the first US image using the initial parameters, and
next for each step of the procedure we determine a perturbation
resulting in performance decrease. While there is no explicit
formula to calculate the gradient of the loss function in
respect to reconstruction parameters, we can approximate the
gradient of the, for example, attenuation coefficient β with the
following formula:
∂J
∂β
≈ J(β + δβ)− J(β − δβ)
2δβ
, (1)
where J(·) stands for the binary cross-entropy loss depending
on the input image, image label, network parameters, recon-
struction parameters β, αl, αu and δβ is the step size set for the
β parameter. Similarly, this formula can be used to calculate
the gradient in respect to the αl and αu parameters. Given the
gradients, we can apply sign coordinate gradient descent and
update the reconstruction parameters in a way to maximize
the loss function and undermine the model. For example, to
update the β parameter we can apply the following formula:
βi+1 = βi+ βsign
(
∂J
∂β
)
, (2)
Fig. 2. Pipeline of the investigated adversarial attack on US based deep learning model. The reconstruction parameters β, αl, αu are updated using zeroth
order optimization to find a set parameters resulting in wrong classification.
Fig. 3. US image presenting fatty liver (reconstruction parameters β=0.9
dB/(cm*MHz), αl=10 dB, αu=55 dB) and the corresponding adversarial
example (reconstruction parameters β=1.05 dB/(cm*MHz), αl=11.5 dB,
αu=54.5 dB, and the difference between the two images.
where i stands for the i-th iteration step of the procedure and
β is the learning rate for the β parameter. The remaining
reconstruction parameters, αl and αu, can be updated in a
similar way.
In the study, we determined the steps in eq. 1 and the
learning rates in eq. 2 experimentally. We found that steps
equal to 0.05, 0.1, 0.1 and the learning rates equal to 0.05,
0.5, 0.5 for the β, αl, αu performed well in our case. The
pipeline of the proposed adversarial attack is illustrated in
Fig. 2. To assure relatively small perturbations, we limited
the min/max ranges of the possible reconstruction parameters
to (0.5, 1.3), (5, 15) and (50, 60) for the β, αl and αu
parameter, respectively. Procedure was stopped after obtaining
perturbation resulting in wrong classification or after reaching
the min/max parameters. The cut-off for the classification was
set to 0.5. All computations performed in this work were
done in Python, the deep learning model was implemented
in TensorFlow [19].
III. RESULTS
The area under receiver operating characteristic curve
(AUC) and accuracy in the case of the second dataset were
equal to 0.84 and 0.82 (27/33), respectively. The correctly
classified cases were utilized to assess the proposed adversarial
attack. We were able to perform successful attack (resulting
in misclassification) on 13 out of 27 cases, with success rate
of 48%. We found that all reconstruction parameters were
used by the optimizer to minimize the loss and perturb the
data. In the case of the unsuccessful attacks, the procedure
reached the parameter bounds each time, but the change in
the network output was to small to result in misclassification.
Fig. 3 presents an example of a successful adversarial attack
on an US image presenting fatty liver.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this work, we presented that adversarial attacks based
on the modification of US image reconstruction method are
feasible. Our approach was demonstrated with a deep model
developed for fatty liver disease diagnosis. As presented in
Fig. 3, even small change of the parameters related to the
reconstruction method may significantly decrease classifica-
tion performance of the deep model and result in wrong
output. This might be probably due to complex behaviors of
deep models [1], [2]. In comparison to the adversarial attacks
from computer vision, which aim to directly modify input
image pixels, our approach is specific to US imaging. In our
case, the modification of the US image pixels results from
the change of the image reconstruction method. Nevertheless,
while we designed the perturbations, accidental changes of
the reconstruction method may also arise in practice due
to, for example, modification of the scanner settings. The
network utilized in our study was trained with the US images
from the second dataset reconstructed using the same initial
parameters. Taking this into account, our study suggests that
to develop more efficient US based deep learning models it
might be necessary to augment training data with differently
reconstructed US images. Our study also suggests that the RF
data might serve as a better data type for training of the deep
models, because training based on RF data does not require
US image reconstruction and therefore should be more robust.
In future, we would like to apply the ZOO technique to
study the robustness of different machine learning models.
The proposed approach to robustness assessment is general,
it can be applied to examine machine learning models based
on handcrafted texture features and standard classifiers (e.g.
support vector machines, random forests). We would like
also to expand our approach by taking into account other
parameters related to US image reconstruction, for example
those related to image scaling and filtration. In this work, we
applied a relatively simple optimization method to find the
adversarial perturbations, but in future it would be interesting
to also investigate other methods. Moreover, we did not
examine potential defences to the attack. For example, the
augmentation of the training set with differently reconstructed
images would probably result in better performance and a deep
model that would be more robust to adversarial attacks.
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